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Collusion over Rules 
BY ROBERT H. LANDE AND HOWARD P. MARVEL 
A s THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES have moved vigorously to attack traditional col-lusive activities designed to raise prices and or restrict output, and as penalties for such collu-sion have risen dramatically, it should not be 
surprising that the locus of collusion is shifting to more sub-
tle forms of cooperation among rivals. The agencies have in 
turn become increasingly concerned with a new category of 
collusive activity-collusion designed not to affect prices 
and output directly, but rather to shape the rules under which 
competition takes place. 
In an interview appearing in the Fall 2001 issue of this 
magazine, the FTC's Chairman, Timothy Muris, identified 
three high priority areas for his new administration. For two 
of the areas, "restraints among professionals" and "[shan-
dard setting," Chairman Muris suggested an expansion of 
long-standing Commission interests. A third, concern over 
the possibility that in the "pharmaceutical industry, anti-
competitive strategies ... [may have] involved agreements 
between generic and branded manufacturers," was new, but 
warranted in part because he allowed for the possibility that 
"[a] branded manufacturer could engage in a series of actions 
that have the effect of excluding generic competition." 1 Each 
of these priorities involves agreements among competitors, 
but none can be classified as traditional cartel behavior 
designed to impose a monopoly solution directly on the tar-
get product. 
Chairman Muris is not alone in his concern for about 
the impact of nontraditional agreements among rivals. 
FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary similarly noted that 
automobile dealers, often operating under significant state-
mandated restrictions on competition, seek even stronger 
regulations to harm Internet-based rivals.2 Such restrictions 
allow for increased ease of comparison among options avail-
able to consumers, and hence can cause existing rivals to 
compete harder, changing market outcomes, even though 
dealer rivalry determines prices either with or without the 
regulations. 
It is striking that, with few exceptions, these areas do not 
involve traditional collusive agreements to raise prices direct-
ly. Groups of professionals, rivals, trade associations, and 
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standard-setting bodies have long been on notice to avoid 
even the appearance that they are engaging in traditional 
collusion. Not surprisingly, their members know enough 
about antitrust law to choose pricing and production levels 
independently of one another. Similarly, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers realize that as their intellectual property pro-
tections expire, the antitrust laws forbid them from entering 
into output or pricing agreements with their new generic 
competitors. In case after case involving these areas, firms 
have instead sought agreement over the rules under which 
competition takes place. Instead of collusion directly over 
outcomes, firms attuned to the strategic impact of their activ-
ities now usually attempt to agree on ways in which to shape 
their environments in order to soften competition and to 
insulate themselves from hard competition in ways that will 
lead to higher prices. 
The appetite of businesses for techniques that can alter 
their environment without running afoul of antitrust policy 
is being fed by new developments in economics. After a 
lengthy gestation period, the abstract theoretical findings of 
game theory-the study of strategic, typically non-coopera-
tive, behavior-are being distilled by academics, business 
consultants, and hands-on managers into practical sugges-
tions for business conduct. These suggestions focus on actions 
that firms can take to affect the responses of their rivals, 
often with the goal of softening competition. One prominent 
effort suggests that decision makers should reduce their 
emphasis on business-as-war metaphors, recognizing that 
warfare can be destructive not only to one's rivals, but also to 
one's own profitability.3 Indeed, the authors of this argu-
ment adopted the term "Co-opetition" for the program they 
advocate, offering it as a way of ameliorating such "evils" as 
"price warfare." No wonder the FTC is concerned. 
We believe that while not every instance of agreement 
among rivals is necessarily anticompetitive, every agreement 
that is anticompetitive falls within one of three categories.' 
Type I collusion encompasses traditional agreements to affect 
price and/or output directly or fairly directly. 5 Type II collu-
sion consists of agreements to disadvantage rivals.6 And Type 
III collusion gathers together and explains the types of agree-
ments to which Chairman Muris now proposes to make a 
higher FTC enforcement priority, as well as many more. 
Such agreements typically do not set prices directly, but 
instead help to cushion competitors from hard competition 
through such "rules" as restraints on advertising, sham ethi-
cal codes, or bans on discounts, coupons, "free" services, or 
extended hours of operation.7 These restraints are becoming 
commonplace due to the rapid fall in the cost of transmitting 
and interpreting information occasioned by technological 
advances in computation and the rise of the Internet. Firms 
now find themselves in competition with a wider array of 
rivals who can readily and effectively put their wares in front 
of consumers and fulfill orders from remote locations. A nat-
ural response by firms threatened by heightened competition 
has been to attempt to formulate rules that restrict such 
information flows in order to mitigate the competitive pres-
sure they induce. The result has been a surge in the impor-
tance of Type III collusion. 
We expect this trend to continue. As antitrust scrutiny falls 
increasingly on instances of agreements to shape competition, 
rather than to supplant it, the need for sophisticated eco-
nomic analysis will grow apace, for not all agreements to 
shape the marketplace are anticompetitive. Distinguishing 
those that have effects that reduce welfare from those that 
provide benefits has been and will continue to be difficult. 8 
The tools for analyzing such situations are likely to be pro-
vided by developments in non-cooperative game theory, 
developments that have previously had limited impact on 
antitrust policy, but which are likely now to attract much 
more attention. The need to avoid obviously anticompetitive 
collusion, the increase in agency focus on marketplace rules, 
and the expansion of the tools necessary to evaluate such indi-
rect collusion will likely result in a central role for Type III 
collusion in future antitrust policy. 
Collusion to Fix the Rules of Competition 
Type III collusion occurs when cartel members agree upon 
and implement practices that insulate cartel members to 
some degree from hard competition with one another. The 
restrictions cause a cushion or space in which cartel members 
have some degree of pricing freedom. They are able to exploit 
this cushion by charging higher prices. 
These cartels limit competition and prices rise even though 
cartel members never agree to set price or output directly. 
Instead, cartel members compete less vigorously in the collu-
sively-altered environment; they compete along fewer dimen-
sions. The agreed-upon practices limit, soften, or channel 
competition, but the firms still compete, in the sense that their 
ultimate choices of prices or output levels are made indepen-
dently. However this additional cushion or space between the 
cartel members and their nearest competitors, and the subse-
quent isolation of consumers, gives cartel members the power 
to raise price within this space. Type III collusion can be 
summed up by the phrase "isolate and exploit consumers." 
When the cartel is unable to achieve a total monopoly-like 
outcome, either because its firms do not adhere to a cartel 
agreement or because they are prevented from doing so by 
fear of prosecution, the cartel may resort to Type III collusion 
as an imperfect, partial substitute for Type I collusion. 
Recognizing that this category consists of more than simply 
a few unusual cases, but is rather one of only three general 
explanations for cartels is an important step for several rea-
sons. Cases in this category present a much more difficult set 
of challenges to enforcement agencies, since the restraints 
employed often consist of attempts to place distance between 
rivals by limiting competition through very indirect means. 
Impairing the abiliry of consumers or their agents to assess 
options easily and cheaply can lead to undesirable outcomes 
even when price or output competition continues to take 
place among rivals in a collusively-altered environment. Yet 
agreements to set rules can also give consumers the oppor-
tunity to make more transparent comparisons among rival 
products, and indeed, agreements can also protect and 
encourage competitive promotion by rivals. In order to dis-
tinguish among procompetitive and anticompetitive restric-
tions, modern tools of economic analysis, including the 
game-theoretic analysis of non-cooperative behavior, will 
need to be deployed in order to predict effects of restrictions 
on subsequent competition. Thus far, such analyses have had 
at most a modest impact on antitrust policy,9 but the growth 
of Type III collusion cases will likely lead to a major expan-
sion in the penetration of new economic tools. Thus far, 
however, the cases that can be categorized as Type III have 
been characterized by rough-and-ready economic analyses 
of the effect of the challenged restrictions on competition. lo 
Examples of rule fixing demonstrate that there are a num-
ber of avenues available to rivals who wish to shape the envi-
ronment in which they compete without actually agreeing 
directly on the outcome of their competition. The most 
direct approach is through trade or professional association 
rule making. Similar results can be obtained by restricting 
advertising. A different approach involves not price setting, 
but rather restrictions on price deviations, such as price dis-
crimination, so that base prices are not fixed, but opportu-
nities to compete are restrained. Each of these approaches can 
be illustrated by examples drawn from recent cases. 
Professional Associations: Pricing and Output Rules 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679 (1978), involved some of the provisions of the eth-
ical code promulgated by a group of consulting engineers. 
These provisions forbade engineers from discussing price 
with their customers until just before contracts were signed. 
Customers could decline to sign after they learned what the 
price of the contract was, but only after they had made a con-
siderable investment of time working with a particular engi-
neer. See id. at 684 n.6. The ethical code made it much more 
difficult for customers to engage in comparative shopping for 
engineering services. See id. at 692-93. 
A group of dentists in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), had agreed not 
to provide patients' X-rays to insutance companies. Id. at 
450-51. The X-rays helped insurers determine whether cer-
tain dental procedures were necessary. See id. at 449. Instead, 
the dentists agreed to require the insurance companies to 
visit each dentist's office to examine patient records. See id. 
at 456. This made it much more difficult for the insurers to 
detect fraud and unnecessary dental work. See id. at 457. 
Neither of these cases falls within the rubric of Type I 
collusion. Neither involved an agreement on prices or output. 
There was no agreement upon a monopoly-like outcome. 
Nor was either case Type II collusion. The organizations 
imposed restrictions on their owns members, not on outside 
rivals, and rivals were not hurt. 
Both cases, however, involved Type III collusion. The 
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engineers' ethical code involved customers directly while the 
dentists' refusal to provide X-rays directly involved third 
party insurers. But the practices had very similar effects inso-
far as they served to establish cushions from hard competition 
for cartel members, II and these cushions allowed revenue 
and prices to rise. 12 The practices allowed cartel members to 
"isolate and exploit" consumers to a large extent. 
These professional association cases demonstrate that one 
cannot readily bring conventional welfare analysis to bear on 
instances of collusion designed to fix the rules of competition. 
Ethical codes and advertising restrictions will typically be 
defended as attempts to increase demand and consumer sat-
isfaction by protecting the provision of consistent, high qual-
ity products. 13 The shorthand welfare test of whether the 
restrictions at issue raise or lower output will often work in 
such instances, but not always. The refusal of dentists to 
supply X-rays was due to fear that insurers would deny autho-
rization for procedures that the dentists would otherwise 
provide-the restriction was thus intended to be demand-
increasing. Yet any consumer unlucky enough to be fitted 
with an unnecessary crown would not likely agree that 
demand increasing was necessarily welfare increasing. 14 
Advertising Restrictions 
Perhaps the most common anticompetitive attempts to agree 
on the rules of competition involve restrictions on advertis-
ing. Some of these collusion cases, such as Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), challenged a nearly total 
advertising prohibition (on lawyer advertising).15 Other 
advertising restriction cases, such as Mass. Bd. of Registration 
in Optometry, 110 ET.C. 549 (1988), involved severe restric-
tions on advertising (of optometric services). 
The advertising restriction cases also were not Type I col-
lusion. They did not involve monopoly-like agreement on 
prices. In fact, classic cartels often would be impossible for 
lawyers or optometrists. Too many independent entities 
would be involved, and the products or services at issue 
would often be unduly heterogeneous. 
Nor could the advertising restrictions be classified as Type 
II collusion. Neither the primary motivation behind nor the 
effect of these restrictions involved outside firms. There was 
no plan to target rivals by raising their costs or reducing their 
revenues. Raising rivals' costs cases and reducing rivals rev-
enues cases are outward looking, while Type III cartels are 
inward looking, with the cartel imposing restrictions up on 
its own members. 
Type III collusion, however, describes these cases well. 
Less advertising leads to less competition and some pricing 
freedom. 16 Cartel members obtain some ability to "isolate and 
exploit" consumers. Cartel members do not enter into any 
agreement on prices, yet prices and profits rise. 
Automobile Dealers 
As we noted earlier, Commissioner Leary has expressed con-
cern with efforts by automobile dealers to restrict competi-
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tion-enhancing information flows enabled by the Internet. 
His concern is well placed; automobile retailing provides a 
number of past examples of restrictions designed to change 
the rules of competition. In one case, FTC v. Detroit Auto 
Dealers Ass'n, 955 E2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992), members of the 
Detroit Auto Dealers Association, consisting of every new car 
dealer in the Detroit metropolitan area, entered into an agree-
ment to severely restrict the evening and weekend hours that 
they would be open. Id. at 458-59. This caused shopping for 
a new car to become significantly more difficult. I? 
The second case involved a newspaper, the San Jose 
Mercury News, which ran an article advising buyers how to 
purchase cars more effectively.18 In retaliation, the local car 
dealers' association, the Santa Clara Automobile Dealers' 
Association, agreed to withhold member advertising from the 
newspaper. 19 This boycott was an apparently successful 
attempt to convince the newspaper not to run similar articles 
in the future. 20 
The facts of these cases differ, but their effects were simi-
lar. Neither case involved a Type I agreement-there were no 
agreements on prices or cars and no agreements to limit the 
output or sale of cars. Nor did either case involve any Type 
II agreements-none of the practices were directed at any 
rivals of the members of the cartels. 
Both cases can readily be analyzed as examples of Type III 
collusion. By making shopping or negotiating more difficult, 
the practices provided insulation for cartel members from 
hard competition with one another. 21 The practices helped 
the cartel isolate and exploit consumers to a significant 
degree, so that the resulting "competitive" (independently 
determined) prices would thereby be higher. 
Price Discrimination 
The examples above each involved a reduction in the effi-
ciency of consumer search or comparison shopping, either 
by making information more expensive or by impairing 
consumers' ability to process information. The latter was the 
effect both of the punishment meted out by auto dealers dis-
tressed by a newspaper story teaching consumers to be more 
effective negotiators and, in the case of X-rays, of the attempt 
to prevent consumers from employing expert purchasers 
(insurers) as agents in acquiring dental services. 
Rules can be set in other ways to shape, as opposed to sup-
plant, competition. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 
658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993) (the Ivy Overlap Case) involved a 
number of agreements among competing universities. First, 
they agreed to fix the net discounts (and therefore the net 
charges) to needy students, an agreement that can be inter-
preted as straightforward price fIxing. 22 But in addition, they 
agreed not to engage in price competition for especially tal-
ented students by agreeing not to offer merit-based scholar-
ships to wealthy students. 23 Since tuition differed from insti-
tution to institution, and since tuition levels were apparently 
set independently, this rule obviously did not fix prices, but 
it did curtail competition for the high ability students that 
----------
could enhance each institution's reputation and ranking and 
thereby shift the demand for its services. 
The agreement at issue in United States v. The Stop 6-
Shop Cos., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 66,689 (1984), pre-
vented grocery stores from offering to redeem manufactuter 
coupons for double their face value. This restriction did not 
constitute Type I collusion because the stores still competed 
on the basis of the prices of the products they sold. Nor was 
it Type II collusion; no rivals were targeted. But the cartel 
members did fix an important rule of competition. The 
agreement not to price discriminate in favor of especially 
price-sensitive shoppers, thus, falls within the category of 
Type III collusion. 
Welfare Effects of Type III Collusion 
Type III collusion lowers consumer welfare in more ways 
than does traditional collusion, though its impacts typical-
ly include those seen from classic Type I collusion. 
Consumers must pay higher prices, and this causes both a 
transfer of wealth from consumers to the cartel and to alloca-
tive inefficiency. 
Type III collusion also can interfere with consumer choice 
and thereby cause an additional type of loss to consumer 
welfare. For example, in Detroit Auto Dealers Association, 
consumers might well have putchased a car that was not as 
optimally suited to their needs, and the dental patients in 
Indiana Federation of Dentists would likely have been pro-
vided with services that were not needed, or even fraudulent. 
Similar problems with uninformed consumer choice are like-
ly to have resulted from the other advertising restriction cases 
we have analyzed. 24 
In addition, Type III collusion can cause inefficiency as a 
result of the need for consumers to overcome the barriers that 
cartel members erected to increase their insulation from vig-
orous competition. In other words, often consumers will 
face higher search costS.25 In Detroit Auto Dealers' Association, 
for example, consumers might have had to take leave from 
work to shop for a car. Finally, Type III collusion can harm 
third parties, as, for example, the Santa Clara car dealers' con-
spiracy not to advertise hurt the San Jose Mercury News sig-
nificantly. 
Conclusions 
Every example of anticompetitive collusion can be explained 
in terms of Type I, II, or III collusion, with allowance for 
some overlap. Focus on Type III collusion can yield a num-
ber of practical advantages. Such collusion often affects 
information flows in markets, either making information 
more expensive for consumers to obtain or denying them 
expertise in processing such information. With technology 
lowering the cost of information, rivals can expect to face 
more direct and intense competition with rivals, and can 
therefore expect to seek ever more opportunities to insulate 
themselves and their customers from the effects of that 
information. 
We expect that a better understanding of each category 
will help the antitrust profession to distinguish more readily 
between anticompetitive collusion and the alternative of joint 
activity that is harmless or beneficial, often because is protects 
or standardized information. This will clearly be a difficult 
process, since many Type III cases involve subtle practices, 
and it often is difficult to explain why the practices at issue 
are anticompetitive. We hope our articulation will help con-
vince judges and enforcers many, though not all, are indeed 
anticompetitive. 
Further, we expect that our formulation of this frame-
work will assist enforcers in uncovering practices likely to 
harm consumer welfare significantly. Since Type III collusion 
usually is used when more traditional collusion is not avail-
able, such as in markets with many firms and heterogeneous 
products. If firms can get together and effectively fix prices 
using classic Type I collusion, why should they bother with 
a halfWay measure like a ban on advertising? For these rea-
sons, rather than just observing that traditional price fixing 
is unlikely for lawyers or optometrists and then concluding 
that they should look for abuses elsewhere, we urge the 
enforcers to examine these industries for examples of Type III 
collusion instead .• 
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in higher prices, "with fewer shopping hours, the public can devote less time to 
shopping, and forcing down prices."); FTC Release, supra note 19 (stating, "The 
car dealers could have made individual decisions to pull their advertising, but 
an agreement to do so restrains competition among dealers and chills the pub-
lication of important consumer information, making it more difficult for con-
sumers to compare dealer prices and services."); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: 
Gender and Race Discrimination In Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 
(1991). Ayres provides the following example closely tracking our analysis: "One 
dealer, interviewed informally, espoused a desire to close his showroom in the 
evening, if his competitors would follow suit. Although forcing consumers to pur-
chase at inconvenient times would seem to reduce the demand for cars, the deal-
er felt that restricting showroom hours would also reduce the amount of search 
that buyers undertake. Thus, the dealer believed that although he might not get 
as many people in his showroom, he would have less competition for those who 
did arrive." Id. at 872 n.90. 
22 See id. at 662 n.2. "The purpose of the Overlap agreement is to neutralize the 
effect of financial aid so that a student may choose among Ivy Group institutions 
for non-financial reasons." Id. 
23 See id. at 663. Only differences of less than $500 were permitted. See id. As 
evidence of this agreement regarding wealthy students, the court cited to the 
retaliatory actions of the Overlap Group when one member awarded scholarships 
based on merit. See id. The cou rt stated: 
Id. 
All Ivy Overlap Group institutions understood that failing to comply with the 
Overlap Agreement would result in retaliatory sanctions. Consequently, non-
compliance was rare and quickly remedied. For example, in 1986, Princeton 
began awarding $1,000 research grants to undergraduates based on acade-
miC merit. After a series of complaints from other Overlap institutions who 
viewed these grants as a form of scholarship, Princeton terminated this 
program. 
24 As we have pointed out, however, the difficulties of analyzing potentially anti-
competitive Type III agreements are significant. Restrictions on advertising can 
lead to more local consumer choice at convenient locations when the restrictions 
prevent free riding on those local services. For a particularly difficult case, see 
United States V. Scuba Retailers Ass'n (Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Default Final Judgment), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0800/0896.htm. In 
this case, retailers boycotted a specialty scuba diving publication for accepting 
advertising from a manufacturer who offered its wares directly to consumers. 
25 See supra note 21 for an example of higher search costs to consumers. 
